DR E. DUARTE
The paper will present a pessimistic outlook regarding the provision of the good order in the South Atlantic. Firstly, an analysis of the available data indicates that drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and piracy have expanded and become endemic in that maritime domain. Secondly, the anticipation of a maritime community 20 years ago, which would foster collaboration among the region’s navies and coast guards, has not been realized. Conversely, the leading navies in the region still lack the minimum capacities and conditions to coordinate with each other. Moreover, the Brazilian Navy, the most capable in the region, has unequivocally rejected any consideration of the functions of a “post-modern navy,” as defined by Prof. Geoffrey Till. Third, domestic challenges to supporting navies in stewarding the sea have not developed in the same proportion as the aforementioned threats. Indeed, at the same time, navies, particularly in South America, have increasingly been called upon to provide good order far from the sea to face inland criminalities and natural disasters.
BRIG GEN DR J. WAWERU
The Red Sea, a vital maritime corridor connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, holds immense strategic and economic significance due to its facilitation of a substantial portion of global maritime trade, including crucial energy supplies. However, the region has increasingly become a hotspot for geopolitical tensions and maritime security threats, particularly due to attacks on commercial and naval vessels by Houthi rebels operating from Yemen. This paper examines these events and subsequent naval responses, focusing on the implications for regional security and economic stability from an African perspective.
The Red Sea’s strategic importance is underscored by its role in international trade and energy transportation, with over 10 percent of global trade passing through the Suez Canal. For African nations bordering the Red Sea – Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti – the stability of this maritime corridor is crucial for access to international markets and maritime activities. Disruptions in the Red Sea can lead to economic losses and pose significant threats to national and regional security.
The Houthi rebels have employed various tactics, including anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and explosive-laden unmanned boats, to target vessels and disrupt shipping activities. Notable incidents include the USS Mason missile attack and MV Swift strike in 2016, the attack on Saudi oil tankers in 2018, and the MT Agrari and MT Nostos attacks in 2020 and 2022, respectively. These incidents highlight the persistent threat posed by Houthi maritime operations.
In response, international naval coalitions, particularly the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, have intensified their presence and operations in the Red Sea to ensure maritime security. African nations bordering the Red Sea have also taken steps to enhance their naval capabilities, supported by regional and international cooperation frameworks such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Red Sea Forum.
The paper concludes that effective maritime security in the Red Sea requires robust regional and international cooperation, capacity building, and addressing the root causes of conflict. African nations, supported by international partners, play a vital role in ensuring regional maritime security, contributing to the stability and economic development of the region.
CAPT(N) R. SAWAN
Various manifestations of India’s naval power within the Indian Ocean in general — and the northwestern Indian Ocean in particular — have been in striking evidence since the first decade of the twenty-first century. India realises full well that the next two centuries will be centuries of the Sea and of Space and over the course of these two hundred years, India will either be a maritime and a space power or she will not be any kind of power at all. India’s ability to use the seas for its own purposes while dissuading/ deterring/ preventing others from using them in ways that are to its disadvantage constitutes her ‘maritime’ power’, which is, of course, military-, political- and economic-power, exerted through the ability to use the sea. The ‘military’ component of India’s maritime power, is embodied in the Indian Navy as ‘naval’ power, and while ‘naval’ power (a.k.a, ‘sea’ power) will always be a subset of the country’s ‘maritime’ power — which has several components that might appear to have little to do with the navy — naval power is, nevertheless, the ‘enabling’ instrument that permits other components of ‘maritime’ power to be exercised. It is also the ‘preventive’ instrument that is used to deny others the use of the seas in ways that are to India’s disadvantage.
New Delhi seeks to leverage its maritime power to achieve the country’s geoeconomic goals as well as its non-geoeconomic ones. India recognizes that outward leaning strategies are the only ones that can enable her to achieve these goals. Accordingly, as Professor Lexiong Ni has succinctly put it, “When a nation embarks upon a process of shifting from an ‘inward-leaning economy’ to an ‘outward-leaning economy’, the arena of national security concerns begins to move to the oceans. This is a phenomenon in history that occurs so frequently that it has almost become a rule rather than an exception.” India’s maritime policy, which like any policy defines the country’s desired “end-state”, is encapsulated by the acronym SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region). India truly believes that the Indian economy cannot ride upon some crest while the economies of its maritime neighbourhood are wallowing in some trough. This requires that the Indian Navy contribute in substantive and substantial manner to regional stability because, as Zoltan Merzei
PROF V. SURBUN
A decade ago, the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) was adopted. It consists of an ‘overarching, concerted and coherent long-term multi-layered plans of actions that will achieve the objective of the AU to enhance the maritime viability for a prosperous Africa’. One of the strategic objectives of the AIMS is the establishment of a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA). The CEMZA is envisaged to be a common African maritime space without barriers. The precise implications of this concept are still being unpacked from a legal perspective, particularly concerning the distribution of jurisdiction. An immediate benefit of the CEMZA would be the pooling of resources and capacity in an environment with fewer obstacles created by the extant jurisdictional framework. Against this proposed common distribution of state jurisdiction over such an expansive maritime zone surrounding the continent, questions over its security from various transnational threats will inevitably arise. Such threats include piracy, transnational organised crime; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and environmental crimes. The role of African national naval capabilities extends beyond defence and entails transitioning focus from national capabilities to an integrated regional approach to achieve the CEMZA vision. Navies would need to engage with standardising operations, commit to joint operations, and foster trust amongst the littoral nations adjacent to the CEMZA. The role of navies in this expansive maritime domain would extend to maintaining maritime security and law enforcement, conducting surveillance, intelligence and monitoring activities and working with other agencies operating in the domain. Having unpacked the CEMZA concept and pointing out its inherent vulnerabilities, the paper considers how the role played by naval capabilities can be fully integrated and harmonised into this regulatory framework.